DISSERTATION
Number DBA06/2021

Capital Allocation Imbalance and the Effects on Monetary Policy

Submitted by

Peter G. George
Doctor of Business Administration in Finance Program

In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration in Finance
Sacred Heart University, Jack Welch College of Business and Technology
Fairfield, Connecticut
Date: May 7, 2021

Dissertation Supervisor: Dr. Lucjan T. Orlowski

Signature:

Committee Member: Dr. Abu Amin

Signature:

Committee Member: Dr. Lorán Chollete

Signature:

Sacred Heart University
Doctor of Business Administration in Finance Program
Doctoral Dissertation Paper

Capital Allocation Imbalance and the Effects on Monetary Policy
Peter G. George
Abstract
This paper examines the association between liquidity injections and capital allocations in the
United States. In the analysis, liquidity injections are proxied by monetary base and the capital
allocations are reflected by excess reserves, vault cash, total bank credit, and M2-M1. Monthly
data are utilized for all variables for the sample period March 1984 – June 2020. Four Bai-Perron
multiple breakpoint regressions and Markov switching estimations are employed to examine
changeable patterns and interactions. The results indicate that liquidity injections are imbalanced
and are allocated to total bank credit prior to quantitative easing, excess reserves prior to QE
through post-QE, vault cash prior to QE and through QE, and M2-M1 post-QE. There is also
evidence of a profound portfolio rebalancing effect especially during the post-QE period.
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Interactions between capital allocations and liquidity injections are examined.
The impact of liquidity injections proxied by monetary base on capital allocations are
imbalanced, following three or five discernible phases of interactions.
Early phases reflect low liquidity injections and high total bank credit, and QE liquidity
injections cause a shift from total bank credit to vault cash, excess reserves, and M2-M1.
Surges of liquidity injections are associated with elevated levels of economic fear.
There is substantial evidence of portfolio rebalancing post-QE.
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I.

Introduction

The Federal Reserve has been injecting liquidity into the market as a means of monetary
policy for many years. It was a monumental event in U.S. history when the Federal Reserve bank
conducted quantitative easing liquidity injections and expanded its balance sheet from $870 billion in
August 2017 to $4.5 trillion in early 2015. (Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet,
2020) This paper examines the transmission between monetary base and capital allocations in the
United States during the period March 1984 to June 2020 in addition to the portfolio rebalancing
effect during QE and post-QE. There are changes in monetary base and the selected variables, but the
transmission is state dependent. It is not the same over time, however, there is strong state dependence
observed by the Markov Switching models and time dependence depicted in the Bai-Perron
estimation results. Monetary base1 reflects the liquidity injections into the economy and the impact
on capital allocations such as: excess reserves, vault cash, total bank credit, and M2-M1. See
definition of variables in Appendix.
The Federal Reserve adds money to the system through its open market operations by
purchasing treasury securities to keep its key interest rate within an intended range and by entering
overnight repurchase agreements. Specifically, they expand the System Open Market Accounts
(SOMA)2 securities through the purchases of large-scale asset purchases (LSAP’s) which in turn
increases the Fed’s balance sheet. (Levy, 2018.) The underlying hypothesis is that liquidity
injections are evenly distributed among capital allocations. Discerning the conditions that drive capital

1

Monetary base is utilized opposed to changes in the Fed balance sheet (total assets) to depict the impact of monetary policy
adjustments on excess reserves, vault cash, total bank credit, and money supply during a longer sample period because total
assets data are only available as of January 2002.
2 The FOMC assigned the New York Fed to conduct open market operations for the System Open Market Account (SOMA).
SOMA is used for managing reserve balances, performing macroeconomic activities, and collateral for liabilities on the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet. (System Open Market Account Holdings—FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK, 2019.)
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allocations is not only critical for monetary policy decisions; it is also an integral component in
gaining a deeper understanding of the market’s core workings.
I surmise the amount and intensity of liquidity injections have an association with specific
increases or decreases in capital allocations. This would imply an imbalance of capital allocations
and have lateral implications during tranquil and turbulent periods in markets. Moreover, I
examine the portfolio rebalancing effect as a result of liquidity injections during the quantitative
easing and post-quantitative easing periods.
I employ an array of econometric methods to analyze the relationship between liquidity
injections and capital allocations from March 1984 to June 2020. Four separate Bai-Perron multiple
breakpoint regressions with several breakpoints and discernible phases are utilized. The breakpoints
are estimated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals among all sample splits. In addition,
heterogeneous errors are allowed to differ across breaks. Within the time frame of the analysis, there
is a particular emphasis on the episodes of high and low liquidity injections caused by
macroeconomic events.
Four separate bivariate nonlinear Markov switching models are utilized to examine
dynamic patterns, intensity, and directional changes in the interactions between the dependent
variables: excess reserves, vault cash, total bank credit, M2-M1, and the switching regressor
monetary base. I specify a two-state Markov switching model (MSAR(1)) where the errors
follow a regime-invariant AR(1) process for total bank credit and M2-M1, a regime-invariant
AR(2) process for vault cash, and a regime-invariant AR(3) process for excess reserves. In
addition, the independent variable is subject to regime switching. I test to determine if State one
or State two is the dominate process from the Markov Switching estimation outputs, smoothed
regime probabilities, and transition summaries. The combination of the Bai-Perron breakpoint
3

models and Markov switching models provide a unique examination by incorporating linear and
nonlinear models in the analyses.
Section II includes comparable literature and respective viewpoints. Section III explains the
background of quantitative easing, liquidity injections, and delves into the portfolio rebalancing effect
as a result of quantitative easing. Section IV provides a description of data and presents the Bai-Perron
multiple breakpoint regressions to examine capital allocation imbalances as a result of liquidity
injections. Two-state Markov Switching processes of interactions between monetary base and each
capital allocation are examined in Section V. Section VI synthesizes the main findings in this paper.

II.

Literature Review

The Federal Reserve has strived to provide safety, flexibility, and stability to America’s
financial system since its establishment in 1913. (Bernanke, 2009) One of the mechanisms the
Federal Reserve attempts to provide stability through is by controlling the money supply which
increases through liquidity injections. The liquidity injections can be permanent or temporary by
purchasing treasury securities or repurchase agreements in open market operations. Liquidity
injections surge during economic downturns e.g. during the financial crisis of 2008. (Huerta et
al., 2011, p. 1) Trepidation and panic are ubiquitous emotions during times of economic
uncertainty and financial distress which worsen already bleak conditions and thus cause the Fed
to act with monetary policy tools such as liquidity injections. It is imperative that we understand
where the liquidity injections are being allocated during times of distress. (Orlowski, 2015) finds
that liquidity injections implemented through quantitative easing do not translate into credit
expansion. Several factors can contribute to the Fed increasing the money supply in the financial
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system, but the major causes in recent history are the Great Recession of 2008 and the Covid-19
pandemic in 2020. Central bank liquidity injections in Europe are allocated to banks’ credit
supply following a wholesale dry-up while banks that do not experience a wholesale dry-up tend
to bolster their holdings of high-yield government bonds. (Carpinalli, 2017) Liquidity injections
enacted by the Fed in response to the Covid-19 pandemic aided banks that are capable of
increasing the loan supply and bank credit because they have greater equity capital capacity.
(Özsoy, 2020)

The liquidity accumulation in the financial system caused from QE also leads us to
ponder if there is a portfolio rebalancing effect. Ben Bernanke suggests that QE liquidity
injections work through a portfolio rebalancing channel that infers a positive relationship
between long-term treasury yields and long-term treasury debt. (Thornton, 2014) The portfolio
rebalance channel’s implication that measures the maturity structure of public debt should be
positively associated with long-term yields. (Gagnon et al., 2011) It is evident that there is
substantial supporting research on liquidity injections and the portfolio rebalancing channel, but
there is a lack of research on the association between liquidity injections and capital allocations
and how the associations have changed over time.
Before conducting deeper time-varying analyses of interactions between monetary base,
excess reserves, vault cash, total bank credit, and M2-M1, Figure 1 depicts the time pattern of the
logarithm of each variable for the March 1984 to June 2020 sample period of monthly data.
…..Insert Figure 1 around here…..

I observe mostly synchronous interactions between monetary base and excess reserves.
The sharp increase in 2008 is due to the surge of liquidity injections as a result of quantitative
5

easing. Subsequently, the decline of monetary base in 2014 is due to tapering of quantitative easing
liquidity injections whereas the decline in excess reserves in 2014 is due to the beginning of the
Fed’s balance sheet normalization. Excess reserves built up as a result of QE and the Fed paid
banks interest on excess reserves so they could control the short-term rate, but the Fed ultimately
reduced the level of excess reserves as economic conditions stabilized. (Chang, 2018) Monetary
base and excess reserves also move synchronously in 2020 with a sharp increase due to liquidity
injections in response to the pandemic in March 2020. M2-M1 and total bank credit move
synchronously besides the decrease in M2-M1 during the 1995 period and the decrease in total
bank credit in 2008 during the first QE liquidity injections. Vault cash has increased gradually
over the time period and appears to deviate within a limited range. It can therefore be argued that
liquidity injections appear to cause a capital allocation imbalance from the graphical
representation.

III.

Quantitative Easing and the Portfolio Rebalancing Channel

QE can be regarded as a bold and ambitious extension of a central bank’s open-market
operations. The Federal Reserve’s unprecedented quantitative easing (QE) policy, the large-scale
mortgage-backed securities and Treasury-purchasing program aimed at bolstering America’s
economy on market performance led to a surge in liquidity injections. During QE, the federal
government auctions off large quantities of Treasuries to finance expansionary fiscal policy and
ultimately raise the liquidity in the economy. As the Fed purchases Treasuries, their demand
increases, consequently keeping Treasury yields low. The intention is to manipulate the composition
and size of central bank assets. (Butos, 2014) During QE, the Fed artificially increases cash flows
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for financial institutions, and research has indicated that increased cash flows lead to higher
company earnings. Consequently, higher earnings lead to an appreciation in company stock price.
(Bali et al., 2008) Though the original intention for QE1 was to relieve banks of subprime
mortgage-backed securities on their balance sheets, it was thought that QE1 could have contributed
to other potentially positive effects including the reduction of corporate bond rates, enabling
businesses to expand operations more practically, and lowering currency values. In turn, allowing
cheaper exports and increased foreign investment as property and stocks appeared significantly
more attractive. Central banks essentially print money to execute quantitative easing, which has the
same impact as expanding the money supply. QE efforts in the United States can be considered the
most sweeping; the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet rose by nearly 60%, from $2.825 trillion in
2008 to $4.482 trillion in 2014, marking it the largest economic stimulus in history. (Bernanke,
2009; Cecchetti, 2009).
Portfolio rebalancing is a critical component in the transmission of asset purchases to the
economy. QE purchases work through the portfolio rebalancing channel because it provides
investors incentives to shift their investments towards riskier assets with higher expected returns
in context of low yields. Some of the investors who sold mortgaged backed securities to the Fed
may have replaced them with long-term quality corporate bonds and consequently depressed the
yields on those assets. (Weisenthal, 2012) In addition, bond yields tend to drop around QE
announcements. (Neely, 2015.). The sellers of the financial assets may try to purchase other
assets with similar characteristics and thus rebalance their portfolios. Banks are incentivized to
rebalance their portfolios toward longer term assets because they want to restore the duration risk
of their holdings. The reduction in the equity risk premium of the S&P 500 brought on by QE
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equated to a rise of 9.6% in equity prices which provides evidence of portfolio rebalancing
because private sector investors fled to risky assets as a result. (Christensen & Krogstrup, 2018)

IV.

The Impact of Liquidity Injections on Capital Allocations: An examination
through Bai-Perron Multiple Breakpoint Analyses

The baseline models for the effect of liquidity injections on capital allocations are as
specified
𝛥log(𝑟𝑒𝑡+𝜏1 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 1𝑡

(1)

𝛥log(𝑣𝑐𝑡+𝜏1 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 2𝑡

(2)

𝛥log(𝑏𝑐𝑡+𝜏1 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 3𝑡

(3)

(𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑚2 − 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚1)𝑡+𝜏1 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 4𝑡

(4)

The data I employ for the analyses are from the Federal Reserve Economic Database of
St. Louis. Key features of the data are documented in Table 1. I examine distributional properties
and conduct Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests prior to estimating the equations. In most
cases, the standard deviations of the variables are comparable or less than the mean of the
variables which indicates minimal variability in the data. However, the standard deviation is
63.8% greater than the mean for excess reserves which indicates substantial variability. This is
expected due to drastic increase of excess reserves during the QE phases and subsequent
decrease during balance sheet normalization. All the data have a skewness between 0.51 and
1.18 which indicates a positively skewed distribution in the right tail. The kurtosis of each
variable is between 2.00 and 2.98 respectively which indicates a distribution that is platykurtic
(values less than 3). Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests are conducted, and I conclude that the
variables are non-stationary at level as depicted in Table 1. In turn, the 𝛥log of each variable is
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utilized to obtain stationarity. The 𝛥log of each variable is used opposed to the first difference of
each variable to optimize the Bai-Perron and Markov Switching models by achieving the lowest
Schwarz information criterions.
…..Insert Table 1 around here…..

I employ four separate Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint regressions with three or five
discernible phases. This is to reduce multicollinearity and isolate the impact liquidity injections have
on each capital allocation as the stated dependent variable. The Bai-Perron models are a good fit
because they are well suited for macroeconomic events split by specific events in time using
stationary data to observe the interactions. The Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint model captures
sudden outside changes such as quantitative easing liquidity injections that could cause changes in
the tested variables and the model. In addition, the multiple breakpoint model captures structural
changes through parameters. The structural breaks provide a unique insight into capturing various
phases of relationship between capital allocations and monetary base split by outside events
opposed to a standard OLS model without structural breaks. (Bai J. &., 1998) The sequential breaks
are identified one by one opposed to simultaneously. (Bai, 1994b) The breaks in the phases
represent significant events that cause a substantial deviation in capital allocations triggered by
macroeconomic events. The baseline models have not been implemented in previous research.
However, I build upon the model employed by (Orlowski, 2015) which examines the impact of
monetary expansion on credit creation.
I observe the impact of monetary base liquidity injections on excess reserves, vault cash, total
bank credit, and M2-M1 optimized with impact lags denoted by the displacement parameters τ one
quarter ahead. An impact lag of one quarter ahead is required due to the positive skewness of the
9

variables and to allow time for transmission of shocks. The Schwarz information criterions in the
estimations are optimized by taking the percentage change of first-differenced stationary variables.
The Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint estimation results indicate that the liquidity injections
(monetary base) have an overall extremely strong positive association with excess reserves. I
observe a statistically insignificant estimated ̂i coefficient of 1.296 in phase 1 from March 1984
– August 2001. However, a remarkably strong statistically significant estimated ̂i coefficient of
51.134 occurs in phase 2 for the period September 2001 – September 2008. An astonishing 1%
increase in monetary base leads to a 51.134% increase in excess reserves. This is caused by the
rapid liquidity injections due to the Enron scandal in October 2001, Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002,
the lack of trust in lending, and the spike of excess reserves to approximately $9 billion in
August 2007. Phase 3 depicts a statistically significant estimated ̂i coefficient of 3.050 from the
period October 2008 – June 2020. The relationship is not as strong as phase 2 because QE
concluded in 2014 and the Fed started to reduce excess reserves after the financial crisis to
control of the short-term interest rate. Banks hold excess reserves to adhere to requirements
mandated by the Federal Reserve and as a buffer to meet unknown liquidity needs. For the year
2015, mandate stated that the first $14.5 million in net transactions would be exempt from excess
reserves. A 3% reserve ratio was put in place on reserves over $14.5 million and a 10% reserve
ratio on reserves over $103.6 million. Clearly, it was important for banks to have additional
excess reserves as part of monetary policy in reaction to the financial crisis. (Bernanke, 2016).
…..Insert Table 2 around here…..
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The second Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint estimation results indicate that the liquidity
injections have a slightly positive statistically significant association with vault cash during QE, but
a negative statistically significant relationship post-QE. Initially, vault cash and monetary base
have a statistically significant negative association in phase 1 with an estimated ̂i coefficient of
-0.978 from the period March 1984 – March 1992. However, I examine a statistically significant
relationship in phase 2 from the period April 1992 – January 2014 with an estimated ̂i
coefficient of 0.124. Monetary easing contributed to cash holdings in banks during this period.
Phase 3 from the period February 2014 – March 2020 depicts a negative statistically significant
relationship with an estimated ̂i coefficient of -0.876 due to liquidity injections being allocated
to excess reserves and M2-M1 post-QE.
…..Insert Table 3 around here…..

The third Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint estimation results indicate that the liquidity injections have
a positive association with total bank credit leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 with a
pronounced shift to a negative association triggered by QE 1 and throughout the QE phases. I
observe a strong statistically significant positive estimated ̂i coefficient of 0.151 for total bank
credit in phase 1 for the period March 1984 – October 2008. Securitization of mortgaged backed
securities during this time period led to the increase in bank credit. The strong switch to a
negative association with monetary base with a statistically significant estimated ̂i coefficient
of -0.065 in phase 2 for the period November 2008 – March 2014 is represented by the QE time
period, which led to a shrinkage in credit that made it difficult for individuals and banks to
access credit. The longstanding expansionary monetary policy on credit creation eludes to a
11

negative association between monetary base and total bank credit. (Orlowski, 2015). The
relationship for the period April 2014 – June 2020 is inconclusive after the tapering of QE
purchases.
…..Insert Table 4 around here…..

The fourth Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint estimation results indicate that the liquidity
injections are inconclusive with M2-M1 during the four phases. Notably, the estimated ̂i
coefficient of 0.153 in phase 5 from January 2015 - June 2020 depicts a shift from inconclusive
results in phase 4 during the Great Recession to a moderately strong association between M2-M1
and monetary base in phase 5 which represents post-QE. This translates to the allocation of
liquidity injections to savings accounts because individuals were holding onto their cash. The
positive association occurs after QE because portfolio rebalancing of this magnitude can have a
lagged effect. The M2-M1 money spread will widen when the fed expands liquidity, i.e.
monetary base increases, and there is considerable equity market risk meaning equity prices are
volatile. In turn, households are likely to sell equities and allocate their assets in interest-bearing
components of M2, small time deposits, and savings accounts. I conclude there is evidence of
portfolio rebalancing with a lagged effect with from the Bai-Perron estimation results.
…..Insert Table 5 around here…..

There is clearly an imbalance of capital allocations as a result of liquidity injections from
March 1984 – June 2020 so I reject the null hypothesis. The positive relationship between monetary
base and excess reserves in phases 2 and 3 are a result of prolonged monetary policy implemented
due to the financial crisis and the pandemic. In essence, the underlying analytical models used in the
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Bai-Perron estimations depict a strong positive association between monetary base and excess
reserves during QE phases and a strong positive association between monetary base and M2-M1
post-QE. Vault cash switches from a negative relationship with monetary base in the phase prior to
QE to a positive relationship in phase 2 which captures prior to QE and the QE phases, ultimately
switching to a negative relationship post-QE. There is a positive association between monetary base
and bank credit prior to the financial crisis of 2008 with a profound switch to a negative association
at the beginning of QE. It is also evident there is lagged portfolio rebalancing triggered by QE from
the M2-M1 estimation results.

V.

State Dependence in Interactions

Nonlinear two-state Markov Switching time series models are employed to capture
complex dynamic patterns and are intended to further verify the estimation results of the BaiPerron breakpoint analyses. A nonlinear model is appropriate in this case because I am analyzing
macroeconomic relationships that are subject to regime change. The model is capable of
characterizing time series behavior in different states by utilizing different structures. This model
has been widely used for financial and economic time series and is a good addition to linear models
because linear models are unable to capture nonlinear volatility clustering and dynamic patterns in
asymmetry. (Hamilton, 1989) The Markov property regulates the current value of the state variable
and depends on its previous past value. In turn, a structure may dominate for a period and then it
will be replaced by another structure when the switching occurs. It enables us to observe stability,
directional changes, and relationships between monetary base and capital allocations. Level nonstationary data is used to capture optimal directional changes. (Davig, 2009)
13

I specify four separate two-state Markov switching models: (MSAR(1)), (MSAR(2)), and
(MSAR(3)) in which monetary base is subject to state switching, and where the errors follow a
regime-invariant AR(1), AR(2), or AR(3) process for changes in each capital allocation as a
function of changes in monetary base. The utilization of AR(1), AR(2), and AR(3) as nonswitching regressors helps control autocorrelation and attempts to bring the Durbin-Watson
statistics within normal range. Standard errors & covariance are computed using observed Hessian,
and ergodic solution method is utilized for initial state probabilities. All tests are optimized by
minimizing the Schwarz information criterion. Ultimately, I aim to provide additional insight and
reinforce the Bai-Perron estimation results.
A Two-State Markov Process:

Excess Reserves and Monetary Base
State 1, A relationship between excess reserves and monetary base:
𝑟𝑒t|St−1 = 𝑐1 + 1 𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 1𝑡

1𝑡 N (0,1)

(5)

State 2, A relationship between excess reserves and monetary base:
𝑟𝑒t|St−2 = 𝑐2 + 2 𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 2𝑡

2𝑡 N (0,1)

(6)

Vault Cash and Monetary Base
State 1, A relationship between vault cash and monetary base:
𝑣𝑐t|St−1 = 𝑐1 + 1 𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 1𝑡

1𝑡 N (0,1)

(7)

State 2, A relationship between vault cash and monetary base:
𝑣𝑐t|St−2 = 𝑐2 + 2 𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 2𝑡

2𝑡 N (0,1)

Bank Credit and Monetary Base
14

(8)

State 1, A relationship between bank credit and monetary base:
𝑏𝑐t|St−1 = 𝑐1 + 1 𝑚𝑏𝑡 +1𝑡

1𝑡 N (0,1)

(9)

State 2, A relationship between bank credit and Monetary base:
𝑏𝑐t|St−2 = 𝑐2 + 2 𝑚𝑏𝑡 +2𝑡

2𝑡 N (0,1)

(10)

M2-M1 and Monetary Base
State 1, A relationship between M2-M1 and monetary base:
𝑀2 − 𝑀1t|St−1 = 𝑐11 + 11 𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 12 𝑚𝑏𝑡−1 + +1

1𝑡 N (0,1)

(11)

State 2, A relationship between M2-M1 and monetary base:
𝑀2 − 𝑀1t|St−2 = 𝑐21 + 21 𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 22 𝑚𝑏𝑡−1 + +1

2𝑡 N (0,1)

(12)

The corresponding transition probability matrix for the two-state Markov process is specified as:
p p 
P   11 21 
 p12 p22 

(13)

where 𝑝11 + 𝑝12 = 1, 𝑝21 + 𝑝22 = 1
The results of the Markov switching estimation for excess reserves, vault cash, total bank
credit, and M2-M1 as a function of changes in monetary base are shown in Table 6.
…..Insert Table 6 around here…..

The estimated process for monetary base in conjunction with the dependent variables is
consistent with my initial assumption of two different directional associations between monetary
base and capital allocations. A large coefficient spread from State 1 to State 2 represents a profound
switching effect. The statistically significant estimated ˆ1 is 0.01 and statistically significant ˆ2
15

coefficient is 0.95 for the changes in excess reserves as a function of changes in monetary base
which indicates a strong switching from State 1 to State 2. These results are consistent with the
Bai-Perron estimation results in Table 2. The estimated vault cash State 1 ˆ1 coefficient is
unchanged compared to the State 2 ˆ2 coefficient which points to a weak relationship that lacks
directional changes. The State 1 estimated ˆ1 total bank credit coefficient of 0.83 is statistically
significant and State 2 has a statistically significant ˆ2 coefficient value of 0.16 which indicates a
strong directional change. The M2-M1 State 1 estimated ˆ1 coefficient is 0.00 compared to a
statistically significant ˆ2 coefficient value of 0.86 in State 2. This further enforces the claim that
there is strong evidence of portfolio rebalancing and that liquidity is being allocated to savings
accounts.
Further insight on the stability of the obtained Markov switching regimes can be derived
from the graphical displays of filtered regime probabilities of remaining in the given State as
shown in Figures 2 through 5.
Figure 2 depicts the probability of remaining in the given State on any given month for
excess reserves. State 1 is dominant until a decisive switch to State 2 in 2001/2002 which is due
to the liquidity injections in response to the dot.com crash and Enron scandal. Notably, there is a
strong departure from State 1 to State 2 in 2008 which is caused by the QE liquidity injections. It
is evident that there are directional changes depicted in the graphical representations and
liquidity injections have a strong association with excess reserves during the QE period.
…..Insert Figure 2 around here…..
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Figure 3 depicts the probability of remaining in the given State on any given month for
vault cash. Vault cash switches states erratically and has many departures. Therefore, neither
State dominates from the graphical representation results. These results are consistent with our
Bai-Perron estimation results because there are many erratic changes in coefficients throughout
the three phases. Moreover, this is consistent with the Markov estimation because of the lack of
spread between State 1 and State 2.
…..Insert Figure 3 around here…..

The estimated process for total bank credit is consistent with our initial assumption of
two different directional associations between total bank credit and monetary base as seen in
Figure 4. State 1 dominates until a strong departure occurs to State 2 in 2002 and then switches
back to State 1 briefly in 2008 and ultimately remains in State 2 for the remainder of the period
through quantitative easing and post-quantitative easing. This demonstrates a weakening of total
bank credit during QE as observed by (Orlowski, 2015.)
…..Insert Figure 4 around here…..

Figure 5 depicts the probability of remaining in the given state on any given month for
M2-M1. It is evident liquidity injections are being allocated to the remaining components prior
to the financial crisis as seen in State 1 prior to the drop to zero. A remarkable departure to State
2 occurs during the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. There is a strong connection between
monetary base and M2-M1 in State 2 which starts in 2008 and remains through 2020 so I infer
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that there is portfolio rebalancing here as liquidity injections are going to savings accounts as
previously observed.
…..Insert Figure 5 around here…..

The transition probability matrix and expected durations are analyzed to further assess the
dominate process. The expected duration is important for identifying asymmetric properties of
capital allocations. (Phoong et al., 2020) The constant expected durations are measured in
months because I am using monthly data.
Expected durations:
State 1: E(D) = 1/1-ρ11
State 2: E(D) = 1/1-ρ22
States i and j communicate if only if each State is available to each other and i ↔ j. The
probability of the ﬁrst-transition is that starting in i, the ﬁrst transition to j occurs after n
transitions:
(𝑛)

𝑓𝑖𝑗

= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋𝑛 = 𝑗, 𝑋𝑘 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, … , (𝑛 − 1)|𝑋𝑜 = 𝑖)

(Diebold, 2016)
The probability of staying in State 1 on any given month for the change in excess reserves
as a function of changes in monetary base is 99.1% and the probability of departing State 1 is
0.09%. There is a high probability of staying in State 2 at 99.3% albeit less than State 1 and a
probability of departing State 2 of 0.07%. For excess reserves, State 2 dominates State 1 for the
probability of staying in State 2 compared to State 1 on any given month because State 2 has an
expected duration of 136.11 months compared to 114.24 months for State 1. State 2 dominates as

18

expected due to the liquidity injection allocations at the start of QE. The probability of staying in
State 1 on any given month for vault cash is 99.8% and the probability of departing in State 1 is
0.02%. The probability of remaining in State 2 on any given month is 97.6% and the probability
of switching from State 2 to State 1 is 0.024%. The expected duration for State 1 is 469.73
months compared to 40.86 months for State 2, so I conclude State 1 dominates. The transition
probabilities for total bank credit and M2-M1 are almost identical with neither state dominating
the other. The expected durations for total bank credit are indifferent so neither State is
dominate. However, State 1 has a longer expected duration of 503.71 months compared to
351.74 months in State 2 for M2-M1, so State 1 dominates.

VI.

Summary

The empirical results from the Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint regressions and Markov
Switching models suggests that an imbalance of capital allocations exists as a result of liquidity
injections from the period March 1984 to June 2020. The surge of liquidity injections during QE
infer a strong relationship between monetary base and excess reserves. I attribute this to the
buildup of reserves due to Dodd Frank restrictions on banks and interest paid on excess reserves
which led to banks hoarding excess reserves opposed to making loans. I examine moderately
strong statistically significant results for M2-M1 in phase 5 of the Bai-Perron estimation which
aligns with the post-QE period. The bivariate Markov switching models further support that
liquidity got allocated to savings accounts as a result of QE. Consequently, there is remarkable
portfolio rebalancing effect. The Markov switching models depict strong state switching from
State 1 to State 2 for total bank credit leading up to the financial crisis and M2-M1 in 2008. In
19

sum, there is a capital allocation imbalance created from liquidity injections from the period
March 1984 to June 2020 which is most pronounced during QE and post-QE periods.
Furthermore, there is a pronounced portfolio rebalancing effect post-QE due to a lagged effect.
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A. Appendix: Variable Description
Monetary Base: Total balances maintained in addition to currency in circulation.
Excess Reserves: Total reserve balances maintained minus reserve balance requirements
institutions hold at Federal Reserve banks to satisfy reserve requirements. Excess balance
requirements are the remaining portion of reserve requirements not satisfied by vault cash.
Vault Cash: Institutions’ vault cash to satisfy reserve requirements that is not exempt from
reserve requirements. Institutions whose vault cash exceeds their required reserves to satisfy
current reserve requirements.
Total Bank Credit: Total amount of credit that financial institutions make available to an
institution or individual.
M2-M1 money stock: M2 money stock consists of M1 in addition to savings deposits, time
deposits less than $100,000, and balances in retail money market mutual funds. M1 money stock
comprises of currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, and depository
institutions, nonbank travel’s checks, demand deposits, and other checkable deposits. M2-M1 is
essentially the interest component.
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Table 1. Mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and unit roots.
Total Bank
M2 – M1
Credit
Mean
1348.44
572.22
37.77
6265.45
5069.51
Standard Deviation
1348.06
896.70
13.46
3678.33
2939.31
Skewness
1.04
1.18
0.65
0.51
0.68
Kurtosis
2.48
2.84
2.98
2.00
2.23
-9.29
-23.51
-3.28
-18.40
-9.25
ADF 𝛥log
1.26
-0.35
-2.48
-5.05
-5.81
ADF level
The table presents summary statistics from the sample. The time period is March 1984 – June 2020. Monthly data
with 436 observations. Mean, Standard Deviation, Skewness, Kurtosis, and Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
are computed. ADF tests in % change of first differences and ADF level unit root tests are depicted. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test critical value at 5% is -2.87. All variables are measured in billions of dollars, monthly intervals,
and are not seasonally adjusted.
Data Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED
Variables

Monetary Base

Excess Reserves
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Vault

Table 2. Excess Reserves of the United States Banking System Capital Allocation and Monetary
Base of the Federal Reserve Dependent variable: a change in excess reserves (in $billion).

Dependent variable
Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

MM/YYYY

03/1984 – 08/2001

09/2001 – 09/2008

10/2008 – 06/2020

# of Observations

210

85

141

C

-0.009

-0.182***

-0.009**

(t-statistics)

(-0.88)

(-3.15)

(-2.28)

Monetary Base

1.296

51.134***

3.050***

(t-statistics)

(0.97)

(6.28)

(4.42)

Adjusted 𝑅 2
AIC
SIC
DW

0.558
-0.314
-0.258
2.252

0.558
-0.314
-0.258
2.252

0.558
-0.314
-0.258
2.252

𝛥log Excess Reserves

Dates

ˆ 𝛥𝑙og

Notes: March 1984 – June 2020 sample period (436 observations); all MBP tests allow error terms to differ
across breaks. T-statistics in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. AIC: Akaike
Information Criterion; SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion; DW: Durbin Watson statistics.
Source: Author’s own estimation based on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED daily data.
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Table 3. Vault Cash of the United States Banking System Capital Allocation and Monetary Base
of the Federal Reserve Dependent variable: a change in vault cash (in $billion).

Dependent variable
Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

MM/YYYY

03/1984 – 03/1992

04/1992 – 01/2014

02/2014 – 03/2020

# of Observations

97

262

74

C

0.011***

0.002

0.000

(t-statistics)

(4.40)

(0.92)

(-0.13)

Monetary base

-0.978***

0.124***

-0.876*

(t-statistics)

(-4.09)

(2.61)

(-1.92)

Adjusted 𝑅 2
AIC
SIC
DW

0.112
-4.300
-4.243
1.761

0.112
-4.300
-4.243
1.761

0.112
-4.300
-4.243
1.761

𝛥log Vault Cash

Dates

ˆ 𝛥𝑙og

Notes: Notes: March 1984 – March 2020 sample period (433 observations); all MBP tests allow error terms to
differ across breaks. T-statistics in parentheses; *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.AIC: Akaike
Information Criterion; SIC: Schwarz Information Criterion; DW: Durbin Watson statistics.
Source: as in Table 2.
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Table 4. Total Bank Credit of the United States Banking System Capital Allocation and
Monetary Base of the Federal Reserve Dependent variable: a change in total bank credit (in
$billion).

Dependent variable
Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

MM/YYYY

03/1984 – 10/2008

11/2008 – 03/2014

04/2014 – 06/2020

# of Observations

296

65

75

C

0.005***

0.002**

0.005***

(t-statistics)

(16.72)

(2.17)

(10.06)

Monetary base

0.151***

-0.065***

0.066

(t-statistics)

(7.43)

(-3.18)

(1.55)

Adjusted 𝑅 2
AIC
SIC
DW

0.233
-7.637
-7.581
1.838

0.233
-7.637
-7.581
1.838

0.233
-7.637
-7.581
1.838

𝛥log Total Bank Credit

Dates

ˆ 𝛥𝑙og

Notes: as in Table 2.
Source: as in Table 2.
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Table 5. M2-M1 of the United States Banking System Capital Allocation and Monetary Base of
the Federal Reserve Dependent variable: a change in M2-M1 (in $billion).

Dependent
variable

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Phase 4

Phase 5

03/1984 –
11/1989

12/1989 –
04/1995

05/1995 –
08/2003

09/2003 –
12/2014

01/2015 –
06/2020

# of
Observations

69

65

100

136

66

C

0.005***

0.000

0.007***

0.004***

0.005***

(t-statistics)

(8.31)

(1.09)

(17.62)

(9.60)

(8.03)

Monetary Base

0.083

-0.074

0.006

0.021

0.153***

(t-statistics)

(1.62)

(-1.47)

(0.13)

(1.57)

(4.44)

Adjusted 𝑅 2
AIC
SIC
DW

0.326
-7.957
-7.863
1.934

0.326
-7.957
-7.863
1.934

0.326
-7.957
-7.863
1.934

0.326
-7.957
-7.863
1.934

0.326
-7.957
-7.863
1.934

𝛥log M2-M1

Dates
MM/YYYY

ˆ 𝛥𝑙og

Notes: as in Table 2.
Source: as in Table 2.
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Table 6. Estimations of Two-State Markov Switching for changes in Excess Reserves, Vault
Cash, Total Bank Credit, and M2-M1 in relation to changes in monetary base.

State I

State II

Changes in Excess
Reserves as a function of
changes in Monetary Base

Changes in Vault Cash
as a function of changes
in Monetary Base

ĉ1 = 68.40*** (11.26)

ĉ1 = 112.58*** (4.62)

ĉ1 = -667.68 (-1.19)

ĉ1 = -1212.78 (-0.60)

ˆ1 = 0.01*** (3.45)

ˆ1 = 0.00 (-0.35)

ˆ1 = 0.83*** (7.43)

ˆ1 = 0.00 (0.25)

ĉ2 = -525.43*** (-129.04)

ĉ2 = 110.73*** (4.54)

ĉ2 = -230.35 (-0.40)

ĉ2 = -6683.93*** (-3.36)

ˆ2 = 0.95*** (182.52)

ˆ2 = 0.00 (-0.52)

ˆ2 = 0.16*** (3.57)

ˆ2 = 0.86*** (8.81)

AR(1) term
AR(2) term
AR(3) term
Diagnostic tests:
Log Likelihood

Changes in Total Bank
Credit as a function of
changes in Monetary
Base

Changes in M2-M1 as a
function of changes in
Monetary Base

0.97
0.11
-0.08

0.99
0.01
N/A

1.00
N/A
N/A

1.00
N/A
N/A

-726.97

-606.09

-2109.76

-1698.64

Schwartz Info.
Crit.

3.50

2.95

9.80

7.92

Durbin Watson
Constant transition
probabilities,
Probability of
staying in:
State I
State II

0.87

1.56

1.81

1.55

0.991
0.007

0.009
0.993

0.998
0.024

0.002
0.976

0.993
0.007

0.007
0.993

0.998
0.002

0.002
0.998

Constant expected
durations:
State I
State II

114.24 months
136.11 months

469.73 months
40.86 months

Notes: as in Table 2; z-statistics in parentheses.
Source: as in Table 2.
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140.99 months
140.12 months

503.71 months
351.74 months

Figure 1. Monetary Base, Excess Reserves, Vault Cash, Total Bank Credit, and M2-M1
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Source: Author’s own compilation based on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED monthly data for the
March 1984 – June 2020 sample period. All variables are depicted as logarithm of each variable.
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Figure 2. Probability of remaining in the given State on any given month for Excess Reserves,
Markov switching filtered regime probability.
State 1

31

State 2

Source: as in Table 1.
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Figure 3. Probability of remaining in the given State on any given month for Vault Cash,
Markov switching filtered regime probability.
State 1

33

State 2

Source: as in Table 1.
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Figure 4. Probability of remaining in the given State on any given month for Total Bank Credit,
Markov switching filtered regime probability.
State 1

35

State 2

Source: as in Table 1.
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Figure 5. Probability of remaining in the given State on any given month for M2-M1, Markov
switching filtered regime probability.
State 1
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State 2

Source: as in Table 1.
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